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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Appeal No. 20060509-CA
JIMMIE AND ANITA BUTLER
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION
UTAH CODE ANN.

§77-18a-l(l)(b) (2003) and U T . R. APP. P. 3(a) provides this

Court's jurisdiction over this appeal from the Memorandum Decision and Order Denying
New Trial entered on May 4,2006 (the "Judgment"), by the Fifth Judicial Districi Court in
and for Iron County, State of Utah, in this case involving a second-degree felony jind thirddegree felony conviction from a court of record.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS. STATEMENT OF
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE I:

Did the trial court err in denying Appellants' Motion to Arrest
Judgment because the court held that their ineffective assistance of
counsel claim did not constitute good cause as provided for tinder UT.
R. CRIM. P. 23?

STANDARD OF REVIEW: "Interpretation of a rule of criminal procedure is a
question of law which is reviewed for correctness." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah
1994).
ISSUE II:

Did the trial court err in denying Appellant's Motion for New Trial
because the court held that their ineffective assistance of counsel claim
did notfall under UT. R. CRIM. P. 24?

STANDARD OF REVIEW "Interpretation of a rule of criminal procedure is a
question of law which is reviewed for correctness." Statev.Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (U :ah 1994)
ISSUE HI:

Was Appellant's trial counsel ineffective for (a) failing to enter into
evidence a power of attorney from the victim to another person; (b)
failing to impeach a critical witness; (c) failing to object to irrelevant
and highlyprejudicial testimony; (d) stipulating to criticalfacrs without
a basis for doing so; (e) failing to protect and properly analyze
evidence; (f)failing to investigate, obtain andpresent evidence that the
signature considered to be aforgery may have been made by the victim
under the influence of alcohol; and (g) failing to object to the
Introduction of Documents based upon UT. R. EVID. 106?

•STANDARD OF REVIEW: "An ineffective assistance of counsel claim.. .presents
a question of law" that this Court reviews for correctness. State v. Clark. 2004 UT 25, f 6,
89 P.3c 162. To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, "'a defendant must show (1)
that counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable
probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different.'" Wickham v. Galetka.
2002 UT 72, f 19,61 P.3d 978 (quoting State v. Smith. 909 P.2d 236,243 (Utah 1995)); see
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also Stricklandv. Washington.466U.S.668.686-87.104 S.Ct.2052.80L.Ed.2d6^/4(1984).
ISSUE IV: Did the trial court err in denying Appellant's Motion to Arrest
Judgment because "the facts proved did not constitute a public
offense? "
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "The standard for determining whether a trial court
correctly granted or deniedst of judgment is the same standard appellate courts apply in
determining whether a jury verdict should be set aside for insufficient evidence. See State v.
Workman. 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993). Under that standard, "a trial court may arrest a
jury verdict when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is so
inconclusive or so inherently improbable as to an element ofthe crime that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to that element." Id. State v. Hoffhin; 20 P.3d
265, 2001 UT 4 (Utah 2001)
ISSUE V:

Did the trial court err in denying Appellant's Motion for Nev Trial?

STANDARD OF REVIEW: "The decision to grant or deny a new trial if. a matter
of discretion with the trial court and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of that
discretion." State v. Williams. 712 P.2d 220 (Utah 1985) citine State v. Lesley. Utah, 672
P.2d 79 (1983).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVIS [QNS
A.

UNITED STATES CONST. AMEND VI.

B.
C.
D.
E.
F.

UNITED STATES CONST. AMEND. XIV
UTAH STATE CONST. ART. I § 7
UTAH STATE CONST. ART. I § 12
UT. R. CRIM. P. 23
UT. R. CRIM. P. 24

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On October 31, 2002, Anita Mae Butler and Jimmie Butler (collectively, the
"Butleis") were charged by Information with Theft, a second-degree felony; and Forgery,
a third-degree felony. R001. On January 15,2003, the matter came for a preliminary hearing
in the F ifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron County before the Honorable Judge Robert
L. Braithwaite, at which time the Butlers were bound over for trial on the charges in the
Information. R0462.
On February 17 and 18, 2005, the matter came for jury trial in the Fifth Judicial
District Court in and for Iron County before the Honorable Judge J. Philip Eves. R0463.
On February 18, 2005, a jury found the Butlers guilty of the charges of Theft, a seconddegree felony; and Forgery, a third-degree felony. R0464.
On May 9,2005, the Butlers filed their Motion to Arrest Judgment pursuant to UT. R.
CRIM. P. 23, based

upon a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. R0347. On July

11, 2005, the State filed its Objection to Defendants' Motion to Arrest Judgment. R0331.
On Aujpist 29,2005, the trial court heard oral arguments on the Motion to Arrest Judgment.
R0465. On October 3, 2005, the trial court issued its Memorandum Opinion denying the
Butlers' Motion to Arrest Judgment and ordering that the matter be set for sentencin g as soon
as possible. R0347.
On November 14,2005, sentencing was held and the Butlers were sentenced to a term
of not less than one (1) year and not more than fifteen (15) years in the Utah State Prison For
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the second-degree theft conviction and a term of not more than five (5) years in the Utah
State Prison for the third-degree forgery charge. R0359. Both terms were ordered to be
served concurrently. Id. However, the prison terms were suspended and the Butlers were
placed on probation for a period ofthirty-six (36) months and ordered to serve sixty (60) days
in jail. Id. The Butlers were also ordered to pay a $2025 fine. R0360.
On November 28,2005, the Butlersfiledtheir Motionfor a New Trial pursu«tnt to UT.
R. CRIM. P. 24 and requested oral arguments for the same. R0362. On December 16,2005,
the trial court filed its Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, Order of
Probation, and Commitment. R0388. On January 9, 2006, the State filed its Objection to
Defendants' Motionfor New Trial. R0395. A hearing on the Motionfor New Trial was held
on January 17,2006. R404. At the end of that hearing, the court denied the Butler s Motion
for a New Trial. R405.
On February 15,2006, the Butlers timely filed their Joint Notice of Appealfromthe
denial of the post-judgment motion. R0424. On March 6, 2006, the trial court entered a
Modified Commitment and Order which included the schedule for the Butlers to surve their
jail sentence. R0427. On April 14, 2006, the Butlers filed their Motion for Stays Pending
Appeal and Applications for Certificates of Probable Cause R0448. On May 3, 2006, a
hearing was held on the Motion for Stays Pending Appeal and Applications for Certificates
ofProbable Cause, after which the trial court denied the motion. R0441. On Ma) 4,2006,
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the tria I court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Motion for New Trial.
R0443. On May 30,2006, the Butlers timely filed a new Joint Notice of Appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

1

Presumed Facts

Elmer ("Elmer") and Edna Butler ("Edna") bought a home in Cedar Cit>, Utah in
approximately January, 1999. R0463 at p. 38. Edna passed away in March of 2901. Id.
Appro>dmately a month after Edna passed away, Elmer went with his daughter Marilyn
Goldberg ("Goldberg") to a title company in Cedar City, Utah, for the purpose of removing
Edna's name from the title on the house and to deed an interest in the home to Goldberg so,
if something happened to Elmer, the house would not have to go through probate. Id. About
six (6) months later when it was time to pay the property taxes on the home, Elmer found that
a deed had been signed transferring his interest in the home to Anita Butler. Id.
Ihe deed showing that Anita Butler has ownership in the home was signed on April
23, 1999, a few months after the home was purchased. R0463 at p. 39. The deed was
recorded in the Iron County Recorder's Office in April of 2001, approximately a month after
Edna passed away, and about seven (7) days before Elmer attempted to remove Edr a's name
from th e deed. Id. Elmer testified at trial that his signature was forged on the deed and that
it was not his signature nor did authorize anyone to sign the deed on his behalf. R0463 at p.

1

As with all jury trials there are no formal finding of facts on the record, hence these facts
reflect what is presumed to have been found by the jury in rendering its guilty verdict in the
matter.
6

48. Elmer also testified that he never received a penny for the home, that the Butlers simply
took it away. R0463 at p.49.
Elmer also testified at trial that Anita Butler and her children would come over and
visit him almost every day, except for his granddaughter Hollie, who almost never cmne over.
R0463 at p. 52. Elmer also testified that he believed it was unlikely that Edna had signed
over the property on his behalf but that it was possible she had done so. Id.
Goldberg testified that Elmer came to her about a month after Edna died and asked
her to go with him to the title company and put her name on the house so that, should he pass
away, it would not have to go through probate. R0463 at p. 67. Goldberg agreed and went
with Elmer to the title company having no knowledge that the property had been tra nsferred.
Id. Jill Orton ("Orton") testified that she is an escrow officer for First American Title and
that she helped Elmer and Goldberg on April 11, 2001, in order to remove Edna from the
deed and give Goldberg an interest in the house. R0463 at p. 95.
Goldberg testified that, in the early Fall while helping Elmer pay the 3ills, she
discovered a tax notice addressed to Anita that had been altered with white out. R0463 at p.
68. Goldberg and Elmer did not know why Anita had received the tax notice, so tf ey called
Jimmie to come over explain why the tax notice was addressed to Anita. Id. Jimmie came
to the house and Elmer asked him why Anita had received the tax notice on the house. Id.
Goldberg testified that Jimmie told Elmer that Anita owned the house. R0463 at p. 69.
Goldberg then testified that Jimmie indicated that Elmer was drunk when he signec the deed
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that she had not spoken to her brother since that time. Id. Goldberg also testified that the
signature on the warranty deed appeared to be Edna's, but that Elmer's signature was not
signed by Elmer. Id.
Kent Peterson ("Peterson") was the notary public whose signature and seal appear
on the deed at issue. Peterson testified that, while it appeared to be his signature and stamp
on the warranty deed, he did not remember notarizing such a document. R0463 at p. 81.
Petersen testified that he only notarized things at his office and that he had no recollection
of Elmer, Edna, or the Butlers ever being present in his office on April 23,1999, to sign the
warranty deed. R0463 at p. 84. Peterson also testified that the date had been hand-written
on the deed and that it was not his handwriting. R0463 at p. 85. He testified thai this was
unusual because it was something he usually filled in when he notarized a documer t. Id. He
also testified that the names were typed on to the deed and that he does not recall ever typing
anything on any document he notarized. R0463 at p. 86. Peterson also testified that it did
not appear that his stamp or signature was altered. R0463 at p. 87. Peterson also testified
that his log book did not indicate he had notarized the warranty deed since there was no entry
for that date. R0463 at p. 91. Peterson also testified that the fact that the transaction was
not in his book did not necessary mean it was invalid, but it was "strange." R0463 at p. 92.
Mitchell Schoppmann ("Schoopmann") who is the owner of Cedar Land and Title
Comply testified that he had done work for Anita Butler. R0463 at p. 99. SchDopmann
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testified that he had witnessed and notarized a deed of trust for Anita Butler whic 1 secured
a loan for $75,000 against the property at issue. R0463 at p. 102.
Matthew Throckmorton ("Throckmorton"), who is a crime scene investigai or for the
Salt Lake City Police Department crime lab, with a speciality in forensic documents, testified
that he believed that Elmer's signature was a simulated forgery, that they were vritten by
someone who had access or was familiar with his signature. R0463 at p. 115. Throckmorton
also testified that he believed that Edna's signature on the warranty deed was euthentic.
R0463atp. 120.
Hollie Butler ("Hollie"), who is the daughter of the Butlers, testified at trial that she
was at her grandparents house every day at least once a day prior to Edna's death. R0463 at
p. 178. She testified she would take Elmer and Edna shopping, to her rodeos, or out to lunch
or dinner. Id. She testified that, after Edna's death, she still saw Elmer everyday. R0463
at p. 179. She testified she saw him drink alcohol every day and that she had con\ersations
with Elmer about what he wanted to do with the house. R0463 at p. 180. Hollk testified
Elmer had told her that he and Edna wanted her to have the house but that, because she was
still a minor, they had deeded it to Anita who would then deed it to Hollie when shs became
eighteen (18). R0463 at p. 181. Hollie testified that she saw Elmer and Edna deed Jhe house
to Anita. R0463 at p. 184. Hollie testified that she saw Elmer, Edna, Anita, and Jimmie sign
the deed and that Elmer was intoxicated at the time. Id Hollie testified that Elmer and Edna
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wanted her to have the house because she had taken care of them in their older years. R0463
at p. 186.
B.

Additional Facts Regarding the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
(1)

Trial Counsel's Ineffectiveness for Failure to Enter Power of Attorney into
Evidence.

At the hearing on the Butlers Motion to Arrest Judgment, counsel herein presented
evidence that the Butlers' trial counsel was ineffective for failing to produce ai trial the
Power of Attorney, which gave Edna power of attorney to sign for Elmer. R046f at p. 13.
Counsc 1 presented evidence that trial counsel was aware of the Power of Attorney *md either
forgot about the document or did not recognize its significance. Id. Counsel presented
evidence that no investigation was ever conducted pertaining to whether it was Edna who had
signed Elmer's name on the deed. R0465 at p. 17.
(2)

Trial Counsel's Ineffectiveness for Failing to Impeach or Disqualify the
Testimony of Elmer Butler.

Counsel presented evidence in the motions at issue herein that Elmer made si atements
during his testimony that carried a very strong inference of guilt, without founds tion, and
trial counsel made no objection and basically allowed the witness to say whatever \ e wanted
to. R(H65 at p. 24. Counsel also presented evidence that Elmer had trouble remembering
his name, age, and addresses and that trial counsel should have attacked the credibility or
competency of Elmer. R0465 at pp. 25-26. Counsel presented evidence that trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to impeach Elmer with the Power of Attorney that was signed by
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Edna. Counsel also presented evidence that trial counsel was ineffective for ailure to
discuss or investigate Elmer's alleged alcoholism. R0465 at p. 26.
(3)

Trial Counsel's Ineffectiveness for Allowing Prejudicial Testimony to be
Presented

Counsel presented evidence in the motions at issue herein that trial counsel failed to
present impeachment evidence on Marilyn Goldberg at trial. R0465 at p. 29.

He also

presented evidence that Goldberg was allowed to answer questions in the narrative with
unsolicited comments that just "kept going on and on." Id. Counsel presented evic ence that
Goldberg was allowed to undertake a narrative in response to the questions she was asked
on directfromthe Butlers' trial counsel. Id. Counsel presented evidence that some of the
responses were highly prejudicial. Id. Counsel also presented evidence that Goldberg was
allowed to speculate as to whether Elmer's signature on the deed was authentic without any
foundation being laid for a layperson's testimony as to handwriting. R0465 at p. 33.
(4)

Trial Counsel was Ineffective for Stipulating to Critical Facts withoi t a Basis.

Counsel presented evidence in the motions at issue herein that trial counsel allowed
the deed in question to be admitted with the statement that it was recorded at the lequest of
Anita Butler, without any foundation being laid for the contention that she recorded it.
R0465 at p. 35. Counsel presented evidence that trial counsel was ineffective for not
requiring that the recorder of the deed be brought in to determine whether Anita Butler had
been the one who actually asked for the document to be recorded. Id.
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(5)

Trial Counsel was Ineffective for Failing to Properly Protect and Analyze
Evidence.

Counsel presented evidence in the motions at issue herein that trial counsel made no
attempi to analyze of any of the documents in this matter. R0465 at p. 36. Counsel presented
evidence that trial counsel should have attempted to undermine the interferences made by the
notaries as to the alleged alterations of the documents. R0465 at p. 38.
(6)

Trial Counsel was Ineffective for Failing to Investigate the Claim that the
Deed was Signed by Elmer while Intoxicated.

Hollie Butler testified at trial that she witnessed Elmer and Edna deed the house to
Anita 2nd that she witnessed Elmer, Edna, Anita, and Jimmie sign the deed. RC 463 at p.
184. Hollie testified that Elmer was intoxicated at the time he signed the deed. Id. Counsel
presented evidence at the Motion hearing that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
investigate Hollie's testimony. R0465 at p. 43. Counsel presented evidence in the motions
at issue herein that the signature on the deed was never analyzed to determine if Elmer could
have signed the deed while he was intoxicated. Id.
(7)

Trial Counsel was Ineffective for Failure to Object to the Use of Copies.

In the Motion to Arrest Judgment, Counsel presented evidence that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to require that originals be available at trial instead of the certified
copies that were used, citing UT .R. EVID. 106 as authority. Counsel argued that copies of
documents do not always contain the same information as the originals do and originals
should be available to make sure no information is missing or altered. R0300.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, "'a defendant must show (1)
that counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's deficient performance there is a n asonable
probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different.9" Wickham v. Galetka.
2002 UT 72,119,61 P.3d 978 (quoting State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236,243 (Utah 1995)); see
also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674
(1984). In making this evaluation, the court must "indulge in the strong presumption that
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is
the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the c) lallenged
action might be considered sound trial strategy." Mvers v. State. 2004 UT 31, f2(», 94 P.3d
211, citinz State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990) (quoting Strickland).
In the instant matter, the Butlers' trial counsel was ineffective. The Butlers properly
brought such issues to the attention ofthe trial court through motions brought pursu.int to UT.
R. CRIM. P. 23 prior to sentencing and UT. R. CRIM. P. 24 subsequent to sentenci rig. Both
motions were based upon the ineffective assistance of counsel. The Butlers' claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel are valid and they should have been afforded relief under
both UT. R. CRIM. P. 23 and UT. R. CRIM. P. 24. In addition, there was no established nexus
to show that the Butlers actually simulated Elmer Butler's signature on the deed at issue,
hence their Motion to Arrest Judgment should not have been denied on the basis that the
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State did not present enough facts to establish the constitution of a public offense. See, UT.
R.CRM.P.23.

ARGUMENT
L

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION
TO ARREST JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIM CONSTITUTED GOOD CAUSE.

UT. R. CRIM. P. 23 states as

follows:

At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the court upon its own
initiative may, or upon motion of a defendant shall, arrest judgment if the facts
proved or admitted do not constitute a public offense, or the defendant is
mentally ill, or there is other good cause for the arrest of judgment. Upon
arresting judgment the court may, unless a judgment of acquittal of the offense
charged is entered or jeopardy has attached, order a commitment until the
defendant is charged anew or retried, or may enter any other order as may be
just and proper under the circumstances.
"Good cause" has been defined as "a substantial reason amounting in law to a legal excuse
for failing to perform an act required by law.95 Black's Law Dictionary, abridged 6* edition,
1991. The Utah Court of Appeals has held that a motion to arrest judgment unde r Rule 23
is appropriate when, "the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is so
inconclusive or so inherently improbable as to an element of the crime that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to that element." State v. Giles, 966 ?.2d 872,
876-87 7 (Utah App 1998). "At common law, an arrest ofjudgment was the trial CDurt's act
of refusing to enter judgment on a verdict because of some error appearing on the face of the
record that rendered the judgment invalid." State v. Owens. 753 P.2d 976,978 (Utah App
1988), citing United States v. Sisson. 399 U.S. 267,280-281,90 S.Ct. 2117,2124-2125,26
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LJEd.2d 608 (1970); see, e.g., State v. Merritt. 247 P.2d 497 (Utah 1926). "The 'i ace of the
record' does not include proof offered or adduced at trial." Id, citing Sisson, 3<!9 U.S. at
281,90S.Ct.at2125.
In the instant matter, the Butlers obtained new counsel after trial anc prior to
sentencing on the charges for purposes of challenging the effectiveness of their tria. counsel.
Counsel herein was retained and filed a Motion to Arrest Judgment pursuant to UT R. CRIM.
P. 23 with the trial court. The trial court denied the Rule 23 Motion indicating that the
ineffective assistance of counsel did not rise to good cause and, therefore, the grounds for
obtaining such relief had not been met. Pursuant to Black's Law Dictionary definition,
however, it appears that the Butlers did indeed have good cause to file their Mot on based
upon the ineffective assistance of their trial counsel.
Under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, every person charged
with a crime is entitled to have the assistance of counsel to represent them on legal matters.
If that assistance is not required to be effective, then a person's rights cannot be protected,
and they are not provided adequate due process of law. UNITED STATES CONST. AMI ND. XIV.
If persons are entitled to the assistance of counsel, but not to having that assistance be
effective, then such a right would be meaningless. In juvenile court the Utah Court of
Appeals has similarly stated that,".. .the counsel appointed to represent parents must provide
effective assistance, because construing the statute any other way would render it
'meaningless or illusory.'" State ex rel. C.C. 2002 UT App 149, f 9,48 P.3d 244, citing In
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re E.HL 880 P.2d at 13. Similarly here, if coxmsel is not effective, the constitutional right
afforded to all persons to have the assistance of counsel would be meaningless.
If you have therightto the assistance of counsel, but no guidelines require that the
assistance be effective, then the right to counsel becomes "illusory." The Butlers' trial
counsel failed to render effective assistance in his representation of the Butlers, as argued
more particularly below. Hence, the Butlers have been denied their right to the effective
assistance of counsel which ultimately led to them being convicted on the theft and forgery
charges.
Trial counsel's ineffectiveness rises to "good cause" to arrest the judgment under UT.
R. CRIM.P. 23. Trial counsel's ineffectiveness led to a violation ofthe Butlers' constitutional
rights, which led to a judgment against the Butlers that may have been different had the
Appellants received effective assistance. Because constitutionalrightswere at issue in the
motion brought under Rule 23, there was "good cause" and reason for the Buters' new
counsel to file their Motion to Arrest the Judgment Arresting the judgment would have
corrected the violation of the Butlers' constitutional rights caused by the ir. effective
assistance of counsel. The Butlers properly brought their motion, supported by "good cause"
to have the judgment arrested based on the fact that the judgment against them was entered
based upon their trial counsel's ineffectiveness, thus establishing the good cause and reason
necessary to file the Motion to Arrest Judgment. The trial court erred in its determination that
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the ineffective assistance of counsel was inappropriate for a motion to arrest judgm ent under
UT. R. CRIM. P. 23.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION
FORNEWTRIAL BECAUSE THED*INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL CLAIM DOES FALL UNDER UT. R. CRIM. P. 24

UT. R. CRIM. P. 24(a) states that, "[t]he court may, upon motion of a party or upon its

own initiative, grant a new trial in the interest ofjustice if there is any error or impropriety
which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party." "[A] motion for new trial
generally is permitted for correcting errors made in the trial court, Wharton's Criminal
Procedure §590 (12th ed. 1976), or for reviewing a conviction obtained by unfair or unlawful
methods." State v. Owens. 753 P.2d 976, 978 (Utah App. 1988), citing 24 C.J.S. Criminal
Law §1418 (1961). An error resulting in a denial of a defendant's right to a fail trial can
warrant a new trial. Id, see e.g., United States v. MacCloskev. 682 F.2d 468,47') (4th Cir.
1982). "It is proper for the trial court, when confronted with a motion for a new trial due to
newly discovered evidence, to consider the credibility ofnew witnesses as well as th e manner
in which new evidence meshes or clashes with evidence presented at trial." State v. Pinder.
2005 UT 15,1J67, 114 P.3d 551, citing State v. Loose. 2000 UT 11,1fl8, 994 P.2<1 1237.
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, '"a defendant must show (1)
that counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable
probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different.'" Wickham v. Galetka.
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2002 irr 72,119,61 P.3d 978 f^fno/wg State v. Smith. 909 P.2d 236,243 (Utah 1995)); see
a/so Smckland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 686-87, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674
(1984). In making this evaluation, the court must "indulge in the strong presumption that
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is
the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged
action might be considered sound trial strategy." Myers v. State. 2004 UT 31, f2C, 94 P.3d
211, citing State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990) (quoting Strickland).
In the instant matter, the ineffective assistance of trial counsel had a substantial
advers z effect upon therightsof the Butlers. The ineffective assistance of their trie 1 counsel
led to the Butlers being convicted of the theft and forgery charges when, had iheir trial
counsel been effective, the outcome of trial may have been different. The substantial
adverse effect required by UT. R. CRIM. P. 24 is similar in nature to the two-prong test set
forth in Strickland for proving that trial counsel was ineffective to the extent that re lief in the
form of a new trial is necessary.
Under Strickland it must be shown that, for ineffective assistance of counsel to exist,
it mus1. be shown that counsel's performance was so deficient it fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness and that, had counsel not been ineffective, the outcome would
have been different. The same can be said of UT. R. CRIM. P. 24. The first proag of the
Strickland test requires proof of an error or impropriety on behalf of trial counsel. UT. R.
CRIM.

P. 24 similarly requires proof that an err or impropriety has occurred. The second
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prong of Strickland requires evidence that, but for trial counsel's errors, the outcoi ne would
have been different. UT. R. CRIM. P. 24 similarly requires proof that the error or iir propriety
has caused a substantial adverse effect on the party. Both require a showing of "pi ejudice."
Therefore, since the two-prong test of Strickland and the requirements of UT. R. C UM. P. 24
both require evidence of (1) and error or impropriety, and (2) a showing of prejudice,
ineffective assistance of counsel can clearly be grounds for the granting of a new t lal under
UT. R. CRIM. P. 24.

It was an err for the trial court to deny the Motion for New Trial by stating that the
ineffective assistance of counsel claim does not fall under UT. R. CRIM. P. 24. At tb e hearing
on the Rule 24 Motion, the trial court stated that it had found no case law in which an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim had been grounds for a new trial based upon UT. R.
CRIM.

P. 24. R0466 p. 2. However, simply because no case law existed at the time

respecting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim as grounds for a new trial under Rule
24 does not require afindingthat such grounds do not exist in this matter. The Bui lers were
substantially adversely affected by the ineffective assistance of counsel and, had the r counsel
been effective, there would have been a different outcome at the time of trial. Ther sfore, the
Butlers ineffective assistance of counsel was an appropriate claim to be brought under Rule
24 and, as more particularly argued below, ultimately met the grounds for relief under UT.
R. CRIM. P. 24 in the form of a new trial.
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ffl. APPELLANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL PROVIDED
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE.
A.

Appellant's Counsel was Ineffective for Failing to Enter into Evidence the Power
of Attorney.
In Strickland, as set forth supra, two things must be established in order to determine

whether the assistance of counsel has in fact been ineffective. "To prevail on an ir effective
assistance of counsel claim, "'a defendant must show (1) that counsel's performance was so
deficient as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that but for
counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome c f the trial
would have been different'" Wickham v. Galetka. 2002 UT 72, If 19,61 P.3d 978 (quoting
State v.Smith. 909 P.2d 236,243 (Utah 1995)); see also Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S.
668, 686-87,104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
In the instant matter, Appellant's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present
the Power of Attorney for Elmer Butler that gave his wife, Edna Butler, the authority to sign
documents for him. It appears that trial counsel was aware of the existence of the Power of
Attorney and even had a copy of the document in his file. However, trial counsel failed to
mention the Power of Attorney or present it as evidence at trial. Had the Power of Attorney
been presented at trial, it may have been the needed evidence to show that it was Edna who
had deeded the home to the Butlers. Under the Power of Attorney, Edna was allowed to sign
for Elmer, and sufficient doubt could have easily been raised that a forgery had not occurred.
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Evidence was presented by Throckmorton that Edna executed the deed. Si rice Edna
maintained the power of attorney to sign for Elmer, she could have signed the deed for him.
A reasonable attorney would have presented such evidence to the jury questioning why the
Butlers would have forged the deed if such forgery was unnecessary in light of Edna's
signature on the deed and her power of attorney for Elmer. The alleged motive snd intent
to commit the forgery and alleged consequent theft evaporates in light of the power of
attorney, hence there is no sufficient trial strategy that can be surmisedfromthe Bui lers' trial
counsel's failure to investigate or present such evidence.
Because Appellant's trial counsel failed to present the Power of Attorney as evidence,
trial counsel's performance fell below the objective standard of reasonableness meeting the
first prong of Strickland. Had Appellant's trial counsel provided the Power of Aitorney as
evidence, the outcome of the trial could have been very different, since a sufficient doubt
could have been cast on whether the allegations of forgery had even existed, thereb y leading
to an acquittal. This meets the second prong of Strickland. Therefore, the Butlers' trial
counsel was ineffective for failure to present the Power of Attorney as evidence thereby
casting doubt upon the very elements of the underlying charge.
B.

Trial Counsel was Ineffective for Failing to Impeach the Testimony of; i Critical
Witness
Appellant's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach statements made by

the victim, Elmer Butler, in this matter. While testifying at the trial Elmer made s atements
that carried a very strong inference of guilt, or had no foundation. However, triel counsel
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made no attempt to object to any of these statements and essentially allowed Elmer to testify
or say whatever he wanted. This may have prejudiced the jury. At trial Elmer also had
trouble remembering his name, age, and address. If he was not able to remember Jiis basic
information, it was questionable how could he remember whether or not he actually signed
the warranty deed giving the house to Anita Butler. However, trial counsel again made no
effort to attack the credibility or competency of Elmer to testify. Additionally, trial counsel
made no effort to investigate the alleged alcoholism of Elmer in light of Hollie's testimony
that she had witnessed Elmer signing it while intoxicated. Failing to investigate the alleged
alcoholism was crucial to the case, because strong evidence would need to be presented to
show that Elmer may have signed the deed while intoxicated and did not remember doing so.
Because trial counsel allowed a crucial witness to testify, whose memory was obviously
failing, allowed him to make statements that contained strong inferences of guilt, and
allowed him to undertake narratives in front of the jury, trial counsel's performance was
deficient and fell well below the objective reasonableness standard, meeting the first
Strickland prong.
Allowing Elmer to make such statements and testify when his credibility was
questionable in the presence of the jury was highly prejudicial to the Butlers. Had the
Butlers' trial counsel been effective, the jury would not have heard statements and inferences
that may have led them to find the Butlers guilty based upon Elmer's own thoughts and
feelings instead of the evidence. Allowing those statements and feelings to be heztrd by the
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jury may have caused the jury to convict the Butlers based upon those statements i nstead of
the evidence that was presented. Had those statements not been made or not beei i made in
the presence of the jury, the outcome of the trial may have been different and the Butlers
would not have been prejudiced by those statements. Therefore, the Butlers9 trig 1 counsel
was ineffective for failing to impeach a critical witness, effectively meeting both prongs of
Strickland.
C.

Trial Counsel was Ineffective for Failing to Object to Highly Prejudicial
Testimony
Appellants trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach Marilyn Goldl >erg, who

is Elmer Butler's daughter. Goldberg was allowed to answer questions in the namitive with
unsolicited comments. Goldberg responded in whatever manner she desired to the questions
she was asked, some of which were even asked by Butlers' trial counsel. Man) of these
answers were highly prejudicial to the Butlers and the jury should have been informed of
there prejudicial nature.
Counsel herein mentioned at hearing on the Motion to Arrest Judgment that Goldberg
wanted the house for herself so that she could obtain the funds to go on a trip to Paris and
that her ex-husband, Scott Dutton, was the one who was the most interested in pursuing the
charges against the Butlers. Goldberg was also allowed to speculate as to whethe r Elmer's
signature on the deed was authentic without any foundation being laid for a layperson's
testimony as to handwriting under UT. R. EVID. 901.
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Additionally, Goldberg made several unsolicited statements respecting ai alleged
crimin;il record pertaining to illegal drugs by Jimmy Butler. The Butlers' trial counsel failed
to adeciuately object to such statements as irrelevant pursuant to UT. R. EVID. 401, and in
likely violation of UT. R. EVID. 404(b), which provides that such evidence "of other crimes,
wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action
in conformity therewith." Having failed to so object, such evidence was provided to a
conservative jury and they were allowed to deliberate with these imfounded and unsolicited
allegations. Such action necessarily resulted in a violation ofthe Butlers' rights to a fair trial.
Trial counsel made no effort to object to any of the statements made by Goldberg or
to stop* her from undertaking long narratives during examination. Because trial counsel
allowed Goldberg to make such statements without making any objections or attempts to
curtail her responses, counsel's performance was deficient and he was thus ineffective.
Because Goldberg's highly prejudicial responses were heard by the jury, it severely
prejudiced the case. Had counsel been effective, it is possible that the jury may have
acquitted the Butlers since such prejudicial statements went directly to the elements of the
charges. Therefore, the Butlers' trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach
Goldberg, directly affecting the outcome of the case. Hence, both prongs of Strickland have
been met.
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D.

Trial Counsel was Ineffective for Stipulating to Critical Facts without a Basis to
do so.
Appellant's trial counsel was ineffective for allowing the warranty deed in question

to be admitted containing the statement that it was recorded at the request of Anita Butler
without any foundation being laid that she was the one who actually recorded it. Trial
counsel stipulated to this fact absent the Butlers' consent, and did not requesi that the
recorder of the deed be required to testify and lay the foundation that it had been Anita Butler
who requested the document be recorded. By failing to object or require foundation, counsel
in essence stipulated to the fact that Anita Butler had uttered the deed although the State had
no such evidence.
To render effective assistance, trial counsel should have avoided stipulating to this
fact and required the recorder testify to these facts in court since the burden of such evidence
was on the State. Because no foundation was laid, Anita Butler was prejudiced since the jury
was required to rely on the stipulated evidence that was not based upon actual investigation
and presentation by the State. Therefore, trial counsel was ineffective for stipulatii tg to vital
evidence pertaining directly to the elements of the charge, thereby prejudicing th; Butlers.
Having shown that counsel's performance fell below the level of reasonableness and
substantially affected the outcome of the case, both prongs of Strickland have beon met.
E.

Trial Counsel was Ineffective for Failing to Properly Protect and Analyze
Evidence.
Trial counsel in this matter was ineffective for failing to analyze any ofthe di)cuments

presented at trial and for the failure to undermine any interferences made by the notaries as
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to the idleged alterations of the documents. Trial counsel made no attempt to conduct any
kind of analysis or investigation into any of the documentation presented at trial or to
undermine or provide reasoning for any of the notaries allegations that some of the other
document presented in this matter may have been altered. Had trial counsel been effective
in this matter, they would have investigated all documentation presented in this matter in
order to determine how it pertained and whether it was relevant evidence to be presented.
Trial counsel also would have attempted to undermine the allegations of the notaries in this
matter as to the possible alterations of documents.
Had trial counsel been effective in this matter, it is possible that much of the
documentation and allegations of alteration would not have been admitted and the evidence
presented against the Butlers may have been very different. Had the presented evidence been
different it is possible that the Butlers may have been acquitted by the jury. Therefore, trial
counsel was ineffective and both prongs of Strickland have been met.
F.

Trial Counsel was Ineffective for Failing to Investigate the Claim that the Deed
was Signed by Elmer while Intoxicated
Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the claim that Elmer h ad signed

the warranty deed while intoxicated. Hollie Butler testified at trial that she was pres ent when
her grandparents, Elmer and Edna deeded the house to her mother Anita and tha: she saw
Anita, Elmer, Edna and her father Jimmie sign the document. She testified that, at the time
of herfirsthandaccount, Elmer was intoxicated. Trial counsel was ineffective for failure to
investigate this claim and for failure to analyze whether Elmer could have signed the deed
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while in an intoxicated state. The fact that Elmer may have been intoxicated when le signed
the deed was a crucial part of the Butlers' defense.
Hollie Butler's testimony was the only testimony presented by the defense at trial and
it was the only time his intoxication was mentioned. When a fact is crucial to a defense, such
as the possibility that Elmer signed the deed while intoxicated and that the forger does not
exist, any attorney would have undertaken an investigation into such a claim since it could
exonerate their client. A reasonable attorney would not I i\c detcrnm d not to investigate
as part of any conceivable trial strategy. A reasonable attorney would have invest igated the
handwriting on the warranty deed and had it analyzed to determine whether it waj; made by
Elmer in, an intoxicated state. *: »-; Appellants' trial counsd clone these things, it quite likely
would have affected the outcome of the trial. Had trial counsel investigated the alleged
intoxication of Elmer and had his signature analyzed to determine whether he may have
signed the deed in an intoxicated state, it is possible that evidence may have been presented
that would have shown that the Butlers did not forge Elmer's signature and they would have
been acquitted by the jury. Because trial counsel failed to investigate this ;;laim, he
effectively caused prejudice to the Butlers. Having shown that counsel's performance fell
below a reasonable standard and prejudiced the outcome of the case, both \ rongs of
Strickland have been met.
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G.

Trial Counsel was Ineffective for Failure to Object to the Use of Copies and not
Originals*
"The rule of completeness generally provides that a party may introduce the whole

of a statement if any part is introduced by the opposing party. State v. Dunkley. 85 Utah 546,
39 P.2i 1097, 1109 (1935) overruled by State v. Crank 105 Utah 332, 142 P.2d 178, 188
(1943) (to the extent it allowed jury to determine voluntariness of a confession). This rule
has been accepted, in part, by the Utah Rules of Evidence, which allow introduction of
previoisly unintroduced portions of a writing or recording "which ought in fairress to be
considered contemporaneously with [the previously introduced portions]." Utah R. livid. 106.
Rule 106 applies only to writings. State v. Cruz-Meza. 2003 UT 32 Tf9, 76 P.3d 1165. UT.
R. EVD). 106 states that, "[w]hen a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced
by a party, an adverse party may require the introduction at that time of any other p art or any
other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered
contemporaneously with it."
Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the use of certified copies of
documents rather than the originals. Copies of documents could have been altered or be
missing portions that would appear on the originals. Even if copies were used at trial,
origimtls should have been available. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
the use of the certified copies at trial without the originals being available. Had the originals
been available then the documents would have been complete.
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Because trial counsel was ineffective and failed to object to the use of copies it is
possible that documentation was used and relied upon as evidence that was incomplete. The
use of incomplete documentation may have led to crucial evidence being omilted or to
allegations of alterations that were incorrect because the copies of documentation were
incomplete. Had trial counsel been effective and required that originals also be available
then complete documentation would have been presented possibly showing different or
additional crucial evidence which may have led the jury to acquit the Butlers. Based upon
counsel's ineffectiveness for not requiring the original documents be available an :1 because
the outcome of trial may have been different if the original documents had been pre sent, trial
counsel was ineffective and both Strickland factors have leeii m<:t.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION
TO ARREST BECAUSE "THE FACTS PROVED DIB NOT
CONSTITUTE A PUBLIC OFFENSE"

As state

»ove, UT. R. CRIM. P. 23 states as follows:

At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the court upon its own
initiative may, or upon motion of a defendant shall, arrest judgment if the facts
proved or admitted do not constitute a public offense, or the defendant is
mentally ill, or there is other good cause for the arrest ofjudgment." (empha ;is
added). In the instant matter, the trial court denied Appellants' Motion to
Arrest Judgment on the grounds that the State had shown that the facts proved
constituted a public offense. However, this is not the case.
At trial, the State's expert, Throckmorton, testified that the signatures of Ji nmie and
A111111 Bi111 vi i m I I 11 \ v Hrn1111 v deed were in fact their signatures. Throckmorton teslifted that
Edna Butler's signature was in fact her signature. However, Throckmorton gave no
testimony as to who simulated the signature of Elmer Butler, only that his signature was
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simulated. No evidence was presented as to whether Elmer's signature may have been
placed on the deed either before or after the other three (3) participants' signatures were
placed upon the deed. Outside of Throckmorton's testimony, no other evidence was
presented to show who had actually signed Elmer's name to the deed, only that it was
simulated. Edna, Elmer's wife had Power of Attorney to sign things for him, and it is
possible that she signed the deed on his behalf. However, since no evidence was presented
as to who actually signed the deed, no nexus can be established between the simulated
signature of Elmer and the Butlers. Therefore, reasonable doubt exits to show facts to
indicate that a public offense has occurred.
The trial court erred in denying the Butlers' Motion to Arrest Judgment based upon
the existence of facts to constitute a public offense. While a forgery is alleged to have taken
place, no nexus or evidence has been presented to show that the Butlers are the ones who
committed such an offense. Since no evidence was presented at trial that showed that the
Butlers were the ones who simulated Elmer's name on the deed, no one saw them take any
such action, and no evidence was presented to show that the Butlers altered, made,
completed, executed, authenticated, issued, transferred, published or uttered the document.
No nex us has been established between Appellants and the simulated signature. Without this
nexus ]t is impossible for the trial court to declare that the State proved the constitution of
a public offense. Because no evidence was presented to show that the Butlers acmally put
the pen on the paper and simulated Elmer's signature, the trial court erred in denying their
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Motion to Arrest Judgment based upon the contention that the facts proved a public offense
had occurred.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION FOR DENYING
APPELLANTS MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL UNDER UT. R C MM. P. 24

As is discussed in

c

11, supra, the trial

uiying the

Butlers' Motion For New Trial based upon its ineffective counsel claim because the Butlers
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel meets the grounds as set forth in UT. R. CRIM. P.
24. Also, as shown in argument III, the Butlers' trial counsel was ineffective in his
representation of them.
Because the Butlers' trial counsel was ineffective in his representation of the Butlers
at trial, and because the Butlers' ineffective assistance of counsel claim meets the grounds
for a new trial under UT. R. CRIM. P. 24, the Butlers should have been afforded relief
thereunder. Appellants' trial counsel's ineffective assistance and representation caused a
substantially adverse effect upon the Butlers, which effectively meets the grounds under UT.
R. CRIM. P. 24 for a new trial. Therefore, the trial court erroneously denied the Appellant's
Motion for a New Trial.
CONCLUSION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the Butlers respectfully requests that this Court
overturn the Judgment and enter other such orders as this Court deems appropriate.
DATED this 19th day of March, 2007.
Mr. Michael W. Isbell
Mr. William L. Bernard
Attorneys for Jimmie and Anita Butler
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Assistant Attorney General
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P.O. Bos 140854
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Addendum ~A~
Memorandum Decision and Order Denying
New Trial,
dated May 4, 2006

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUMY,
STATE OF UTAH

1

1\

/J-V^

STATE OF UTAH,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AN])
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL

Plaintiff,
vs.
ANITA BUTLER,
Defendant.

Case No. 0215001175
Judge John J. Walton
_J

The above entitled matter came before the court for hearing on January 18,2006 for
purposes of oral argument on Defendant's Motion for New Trial. Defendant Anita Butler
waived her appearance and appeared by and through her attorney Michael IsBell, and the State
of Utah appeared by and through Chief Deputy Iron County, Troy A. Little. The court heard
arguments and reviewed memorandum from both parties. The court enters the following ruling
on Defendant's Motion.

BACKGROUND
Defendants Jimmie Butler and Anita Butler were found guilty of forgery and theii by Jury
Verdict on February 18, 2005. Defendant now seeks a new trial pursuant to Rule 24, Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
Reference is made to the Memorandum Decision of Judge Eves dated October 3, 2005.
That Memorandum Decision contains a description of the facts and procedural history of the
case.

MOTION UNDER RULE 24
The court is not persuaded that a Motion for New Trial is the appropriate procedure to
pursue a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. The court can find no precedent for such a
Motion. Defendant's Motion is not based on newly discovered evidence. The parties si pulated
that the evidence Defendant claims should have been presented to the jury was known t<: her and
to her counsel at the time of trial. Nor are the grounds traditionally made the basis of a Motion
for a New Trial alleged in this case. Defendant may pursue her claim for ineffective assistance
of counsel on appeal.
COURT'S PRIOR DECISION
The court finds that Defendant's Motion (or a near duplicate of the current motic i) was
previously filed by the Defendant pursuant to Rule 23, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (as a
Motion to Arrest Judgment) and was denied by Judge Eves. The court finds the reasoning in
Judge Eves5 decision persuasive in denying Defendant's Motion for New Trial. The
Memorandum Opinion dated October 3,2005, is, therefore, incorporated herein.
DEFENDANT'S SUBSTANTIVE ARGUMENT
Defendant's claim is that her trial attorney should have presented evidence to the jury of a
Power of Attorney allegedly granted by the victim to his now deceased wife. ThePowurof
Attorney was allegedly given to the victim prior to the execution of the deed the I )efen:tant's
were found to have forged or uttered. The Defendant argues that since the victim's wifr
apparently signed the deed that there would be no reason for Defendants to forge the victim's
signature. In short, the victim's wife could have transferred the property to the Defendants on
-2-

her husband's behalf pursuant to the Power of Attorney.
As Judge Eves previously ruled, Defendant's attorney's trial strategy was likely tactical.
Evidence of the Power of Attorney would have been at odds with the Defendant's k n \\ tins
who testified that she saw the victim sign the deed. Therefore, evidence of the Power of
Attorney may have been deemed contrary to the Defendant's most exculpatory evidence.
Defendant's other arguments claiming ineffective assistance of counsel were not
emphasized by Defendant at oral argument and the court finds that each constitutes second
guessing and conclusory allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant's current
counsel may have: t it: ied the case differently, bfotihe decisions of trial counsel cannot be
successfully challenged by simply claiming that a dilS^rent procedural or substantive strategy
should have been followed.

\

V

The court finds that there is not sufficient evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel as
required bv Strickland vs. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed 2d 674 (1984).
There has been no showing that counsel errors were so serious that Defendant's attorney was not
functioning as counsel as guaranteed tl: w :: Defendant I1 "« llic" Si x Hi Amendment. There 1 m. bee : i • , :i i >
showing that a deficient performance prejudiced the defense or that counsel's conduct or his trial
strategy so undermined the pioper function of the adversarial process thai tin- Inal eaniu ' be
relied on as having produced a just result.
By granting the Defendant's Motion the court: would be doing what Strickland

nts,

i.e... second-guessing trial counsel's strategic choices, however flawed those choices m: ght
appear in retrosptxI I loi has 1 here has been a showing tip! Iml lot defense e miser's

-3-

unprofessional errors the result of the proceedings would have been different. Strickland. 466
694.
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
The basis of Defendant's remaining arguments are not entirely clear but appear to be that
no public offense was committed, or that the Jury's Verdict was not supported by the facts of the
case.
The court finds that there is sufficient evidence in the record on which the Jury could have
reached its Verdict. First, the court notes that Defendant should have marshaled the evidence in
support of the Jury's Verdict in attempt to demonstrate that the Verdict is not supported by the
record. The Defendant has not done so. In fact, Defendant has simply argued the evidence in a
manner most favorable to her position.
The court finds that the Jury had a choice: did they believe the victim signed the deed,
forgot the signing and that the expert witness was mistaken, or did they believe that the
Defendants prepared and/or uttered the deed for their own gain? The Jury's conclusion as to the
latter is supported by facts in the record.
The court finds that this Motion was denied by Judge Eves when previously capi oned as a
Motion to Arrest Judgment. Notwithstanding the different standard that may be appropriate for
ruling on a Motion for New Trial, the same reasoning that Judge Eves applied in denying the
Motion to \IH«1 Imlyniait is applicable to Defendant's Rule 24 Motion for Nn^ Trial, and the
court incorporates Judge Eves' Memorandum Decision herein. The verdict is supported by the
evidence and there is adequate evidence that a public offense was committed, gee Menr orandum
Opinion of October 3,2005.

The Defendant's final claim is that the Defendant's theft conviction hinges on an
improper forgery conviction and should be set aside. However, the Court finds that the Jury's
forgery verdict is supported by the evidence.
CONCLUSION
Based on (lie foregoing, Defendant's Motion for New Trial is denied.
Dated this

7

day of May, 2006.

^c—<9>

/

JOHN J. WALTON
District Court Judge
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